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Abstract
The world is moving toward efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Net emission
reduction efforts may involve the agricultural sector through options such as planting of trees,
crop and livestock management changes, and production of biofuels. However, such options can
be competitive with domestic food production. In a free trade arena, reduced domestic food
production could stimulate increased production and exports in other countries, which are not
pursuing similar mitigative courses of action. As a consequence, net emission reductions in
implementing countries may be offset by activities stimulated in other countries. In addition
producers in countries where agriculture may be influenced through higher fuel or other emission
related prices and opportunities have expressed concern relative to their competitive position vis
a vis countries which are not trying to reduce net emissions.
We examine the competitive effects of differential mitigation efforts on agricultural food
production and on international trade. In doing this we employ the assumption that the average
U.S. compliance caused cost increase would also occur in other complying countries. We
consider implementation: 1) unilaterally by the U.S., 2) by all Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries
and 3) globally. The results, which are only suggestive of the types of effects that would be
observed due to the simplifying cost assumptions, indicate compliance causes supply cutbacks in
regulated countries and increases in non-regulated countries. In addition, the study results show
that U.S. agricultural producers are more likely to benefit from a Kyoto Protocol like
environment but that consumers are likely to be hurt in terms of their agricultural welfare.
Key words: leakage, international trade, agricultural and forest sector, greenhouse gas,
mitigation implementation.
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Leakage and Comparative Advantage Implications of Agricultural
Participation in Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation
Society has increasingly become concerned with the potential climate implications of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and GHG atmospheric concentration. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, projects that GHG concentrations will cause global average
temperature to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C between 1990 and 2100 (IPPC, 2001). In turn such
warming is predicted to alter agricultural production, raise sea level, change habitat boundaries
for many plants and animals, and induce a number of other changes (IPCC, 2001b, USGCRP,
National Assessment Team, 2000). Numerous strategies have been proposed to mitigate GHG
emissions, a number of which involve agriculture and forestry (McCarl and Schneider, 2000,
2001). In particular, agriculture and forestry may be important players due to their emissions
levels where as summarized in the IPCC, 2001a report agriculture is one of the primary emitters
on nitrous oxide and methane with over 50% of the nitrous oxide, about 40% of the methane , a
smaller set of carbon emissions due to farming activities, and the two sectors, particularly
forestry are involved with larger emissions due to land use change and the sectors contain
potential large sequestration and biofuel offset potential.
GHG concentrations and their climate effects are global, thus all countries will share the
benefits from GHG emission (GHGE) mitigation, but in the absence of widespread trading and
emission caps only countries adopting mitigation measures will directly bear the costs. This
implies two things.
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 Producers in emitting industries, and users of emission intensive products
within countries mitigating GHG emissions are likely to experience increased
production costs since mitigation actions are likely to make fuel, fertilizer and other
petrochemicals prices rise along with raising the possibility of emissions related
payments for land use change, fertilizer related nitrous oxide emissions, livestock
related methane/nitrous oxide emissions and rice related methane emissions.
 Competing producers in non-adopting countries may gain advantage and trade market
share stimulating both
o shifts in comparative advantage and
o expanded GHG emissions reflecting emission leakage into other countries..
This paper reports on a first order examination of the producer welfare, comparative
advantage and leakage impacts of differential GHG emission (GHGE) mitigation efforts.
Specifically, we examine international production and U.S. agricultural sector implications
under: 1) unilateral U.S. GHGE mitigation implementation, 2) developed country
implementation (in those countries falling within the Annex Ia list under the Kyoto Protocol and
3) global implementation.

a

The Annex I countries are those listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change.
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1. Background
The welfare and leakage effects of agricultural GHG mitigation have been the subject of
a number of studies. Let us review these categorized by the major issues in the bullets above.
1.1 Production cost and producer welfare
The implications of pursuing agriculturally based GHG mitigation for domestic
production cost and farm income has been a concern of producer groups. For example, in 1998
the U.S. Farm Bureau advanced a position that it will not support ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol (KP) unless principal international market competitor countries were also covered by
the KP terms (Francl, 1997, Francl, Nadler and Bast, 1998). Francl and associates asserted that
substantial farm income (up to 84%) would be lost due to increases in fuel prices. However,
later analyses that considered factor substitution, product price adjustments and consumer
demand reactions (McCarl et al 1997, USDA, 1999, Antle at al ,1999, Konyar and Howitt ,2000 ,
Peters et al, 2001) found producer welfare reductions but of much smaller magnitudes (generally
below 10%). However, none of these studies considered the effects of possible payments to
farmers for carbon sequestration or taxes for methane and nitrous oxide emissions emissions
from livestock, fertilization, and other sources.
More recent work by McCarl and Schneider, 1999, 2001 examined both the effects of
higher input prices and the effects of possible payments for agricultural GHG offsets finding that
producers can benefit in aggregate largely due to the combination of direct carbon payments and
the market price increasing features associated with a substitution of carbon production for some
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existing agricultural production. Similarly, Antle et al 2002 argue that producer
incomes will be enhanced by carbon payments but did not consider possible market price
changes.
Across all of the studies mentioned above the assumption of constant agricultural
conditions on behalf of international trading partners was madeb. However, GHGE mitigation
will be wider in scope than a unilateral U.S. effort and there may be actions on behalf of other
participants in the world agricultural commodity markets. Thus, when there are mitigative
actions either unilaterally or globally this may have important implications for the implementing
and non-implementing countries and for net GHGE reductions after leakage. This will be
investigated in this paper.
1.2 Shifts in Comparative Advantage
A rich literature has emerged on shifts in comparative advantage as caused by
environmental regulation. The fundamental argument is that regulations in one country may
shift production to other countries (Pethig, 1976). The overall literature on this topic was
reviewed by Jaffe et al who concluded “…regulation clearly imposes large direct and indirect
costs on society …”(pg 159) but they also conclude that “there is relatively little evidence … that
environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on competitiveness” (page 157). This
suggests that adjustments in production patterns may help mitigate the effects of regulations as
found in the carbon tax related studies reviewed just above.

b

This is mentioned on page 41-42 of the USDA(1999) report but is not quantitatively explored.
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1.3 Leakage
Leakage occurs in a GHGE context when actions to offset emissions in one country
stimulate additional production and consequent emissions in other countries. Several papers
have examined the potential empirical magnitude of leakage when GHG abatement actions (e.g.,
emissions limits, carbon taxes, or tradable permits) are applicable to only a subset of the world’s
countries mainly in an energy context (e.g., Oliveira-Martins et al., 1992; Smith, 1998; Bernstein
et al., 1999; Barker, 1999; Babiker, 2001 ). These leakage estimates range from negligible
(Barker, 1999) to substantial (Felder and Rutherford, 1993), but typically are in the range of 1020 percent of targeted country emission reductions.
Agricultural and forestry related leakage studies have also been done. Wu (2000)
examined leakage relative to the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which pays farmers
to retire land from crop production. Using data from the Natural Resources Inventory, Wu found,
average leakage of about 20% within the U.S. with farmers adding additional lands but
international leakage was not considered. Leakage was also found to occur with participation in
U.S. crop commodity programs (Brooks et al., 1992; Hoag et al., 1993). Alig et al. (1997)
examined leakage in a forestry context and find cases where the leakage rate for carbon
sequestration projects exceeds 100%. Sedjo and Sohngen (2000) examine international leakage
resulting from the establishment of large-scale forest carbon plantations using a model of the
global timber market and find leakage rates up to 40%.
None of these investigations examined the international agricultural effects which we will
attempt herein.
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2. Scope of GHGE Reduction Implementation
In this paper we will examine the leakage and comparative advantage implications of
three different international implementation and trading cases.
1. Case I – Unilateral implementation where a country or a group of countries decides to
unilaterally implement GHG mitigation. This might happen today the Kyoto Protocol
is implemented internationally without U.S. participation or if the U.S. implements
the President’s Clean Air Initiative and the rest of the world fails to implement the
KP. In these cases, one would expect the implementing countries would be expected
to experience higher costs of domestic production yielding lower levels of their
domestic production and exports, and higher prices. Simultaneously, nonimplementing countries would be expected to increase domestic production and world
market share thereby offsetting some of the GHG emission gains in implementing
countries.
2. Case II – Partial global implementation where a relatively large group implement
GHG mitigation policies. This might have happened if the KP was implemented as
envisioned by all Annex I countries but the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM)
turned out to be an ineffective way of drawing other countries into GHG emission
mitigating activities. In such a case, the Annex I countries would be expected to lose
comparative advantage on average relative to Non-Annex I countries. The net impacts
on individual Annex I countries and magnitude of emission leakage, however, might
be different from Case I.
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3. Case III – Global implementation where all countries implement a mitigation
policy. This might have happened if the world would have implemented the KP and
involve also all Non-Annex I countries through mechanisms such as the CDM. In
this setting, all countries would experience higher costs of production.

3. Modeling
The cases mentioned above will be evaluated herein. To do that we need a model that
portrays global agricultural trade and simultaneously allows examination of detailed GHGE
mitigation possibilities within implementing countries. A model with such global scope and
regional detail was not available or practical to construct for this investigation. Thus, we used a
model that satisfies some of the needed characteristics and combined it with an assumption laden
analytical approach.
Specifically we used the greenhouse gas version of the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model
(ASMGHG) developed by Schneider (2000) and McCarl and Schneider (2001). This model
arose from the base ASM as described in McCarl et al. (2001) and Chang et al. (1992) with the
addition of details on soil type dependent production (developed in conjunction with USDA
NRCS) and a global trade representation via spatial equilibrium models for eight commodities as
developed by Chen and McCarl (2000) and Chen (1999). The combined ASMGHG model
considers agricultural production, consumption, and trade in developed and developing countries
simultaneously. Overall characteristics of the model are discussed below.
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3.1 General Structure of the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model
Like many agricultural sector models, ASMGHG is a price-endogenous mathematical
program following the market equilibrium and welfare optimization concept developed in
Samuelson (1952), and Takayama and Judge (1971). ASMGHG assumes individual producers
and consumers cannot influence commodity or input market prices. Production and use of
farming inputs are portrayed in 63 regions in the U.S. and for 28 foreign regions. Data on
currently observed trade quantities, prices, transportation costs, and supply and demand
elasticities were obtained from Fellin and Fuller (1997, 1998), USDA statistical sources (1994a,
b, c; annual), and the USDA, SWOPSIM model (Roningen, 1991).
3.2 Modeling Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Strategies
Schneider (2000) added a GHGE mitigation component to the United States part of ASM.
This component introduces production alternatives and GHG net emission accounting to reflect
the GHG consequences of changes in crop mix, tillage, irrigation, fertilization, afforestation,
biofuel production and livestock management. Livestock management options involve: 1) herd
size, 2) liquid manure system alterations on dairy and hog farms, 3) enteric fermentation
management involving use of growth hormones for dairy cows and 4) stocker/feedlot production
system adoption. A detailed technical description of all considered mitigation strategies is
contained in Schneider (2000). In terms of GHGE accounting ASMGHG considers:
•

Direct carbon emissions from fossil fuels (diesel, gasoline, natural gas, heating oil, and
LP gas) used in tillage, harvesting, or irrigation water pumping.
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•

Carbon emissions or sequestration arising from altered soil organic matter
stimulated by adopted tillage system or land use change to and from croplands,
forestlands and grasslands.

•

Indirect carbon emissions from manufacture of fossil fuel intensive inputs (fertilizers,
pesticides).

•

Carbon offsets from biofuel production (ethanol, power plant feedstock via production
of switchgrass, poplar, and willow) as well as associated and methane and nitrous
oxide emission changes from biomass combustion.

•

Nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer usage.

•

Methane emissions from enteric fermentation, and rice cultivation.

•

Methane savings from manure management changes as well as both methane and
nitrous oxide emission alterations from herd size alterations.
Individual emissions were converted to carbon equivalent measures using global

warming potential from the IPCC(2001 a) report (23 for methane and 296 for nitrous oxide).
Obviously this GHG component only examines detailed emission management
possibilities in the U.S. but not in the rest of the world. This limitation implies that global
adjustment to GHGE mitigation incentives cannot simulated accurately outside the U.S. but
instead is approximated using simplifying assumptions in the remainder of the analysis.
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4. Experimental Results and Implications
Three alternative mitigation implementation scenarios are simulated. The first scenario
assumes unilateral mitigation efforts in U.S. agriculture only. The second corresponds to a KP
like situation with simultaneous implementation in all Annex I countries. The third involves
worldwide implementation. Since we do not model the whole economy we simulate agricultural
actions in terms of an exogenous carbon equivalent (CE) price that would obviously be set in a
general equilibrium setting generating the supply curve of agricultural offsets. All scenarios are
analyzed over a range of exogenously set carbon equivalent (CE) prices ranging from 0 to 500
dollars per ton.
4.1 Unilateral Implementation in Just the United States
The U.S. agricultural sector effects of a unilateral U.S. emission policy implementation
over a range of CE prices are listed in Table 1 and 2, which show percentage changes from a
zero CE price. Total CE emissions decline steadily as the price rises. At $100 per ton, net
emissions of CE from U.S. agriculture are about zero with the realized levels of carbon
sequestration from carbon sinks offsetting all agricultural emissions.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 confirm that emission reductions are obtained at the
expense of conventional crop production. Increasing CE prices cause decreases in U.S.
production and exports along with increases in prices for conventional agricultural commodities.
In addition, since the U.S. is a major trading country, production in other countries is influenced
and comparative advantage shifts partially to those countries. Across the range of prices
substantial leakage can be observed. For example, at a $100 price total U.S. production falls by
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2.5% with traded production falling by 6.5% but global production only falls by 0.40%
and production in non U.S. Annex I and non Annex I countries expands by 2.66% and 12.22%
respectively.
Welfare impacts for unilateral implementation of GHGE mitigation efforts in the U.S. are
listed in Table 2. U.S. consumers' surplus decreases monotonically with CE-price increases.
Producers’ surplus on the other hand is only reduced for CE-prices below $55 per ton but
increases above that level. The change in producers’ surplus arises from both the traditional
commodities markets and the CE-price induced GHG payments/charges. These
payments/charges include: 1) charges at the CE-price for emissions from land use change, fuel
use, livestock, rice, fertilization and other emissions; 2) higher costs for fertilizer and other
inputs due to the embodied emissions in their manufacture; 3) sequestration payments for
increased soil, grassland and forest carbon storage; and 4) payments for the production of
biofuels. In the U.S. only implementation case, producer gains from higher commodity prices
more than offset losses from lower levels of domestic production. GHG accounting results in a
net cost if emissions charges outweigh sequestration and biofuel payments. For prices below
$100 per ton, net emissions are positive resulting in additional sectoral cost. Above this price,
the amount of carbon sequestration and biofuel related carbon offsets exceed emissions and thus
provide additional sectoral revenue. The results also differ from the pure carbon tax studies
showing larger total welfare impacts than the most comparable USDA(1999) and McCarl et
al(1977) studies as the emissions effects on non CO2 gasses cause larger cutbacks and bigger
welfare effects. They also show consideration of international adjustment is also relevant.
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Trade surplus measures the welfare of consumers and producers in non-U.S.
countries attributable to trade of agricultural commodities. If the U.S. alone implements
agricultural provisions for mitigation, the impact on welfare in other countries is negative with
the magnitude getting bigger as the CE-price increases.
The results are also suggestive of what would happen under a rest of the world
implementation of Kyoto without U.S. participation. Namely one would expect the mirror image
of the findings here with market share flowing to the U.S. and a leakage effect. On the other
hand recent analyses by integrated assessment groups (i.e. Babicker et al ,2002) show that under
such circumstances it is likely that carbon prices will be very low in the $3 to $10 range and
perhaps Kyoto combined with the U.S. 18% greenhouse gas intensity reduction climate change
strategy.
4.2 Representing Mitigation Induced Shifts in ROW Countries
Mitigation efforts in regions outside of the U.S. could not be modeled explicitly because we did
not have detailed data of production technologies in foreign regions, rather having excess supply
curves. Thus, a simplifying assumption was made to depict the supply shifts in foreign
countries. Namely, the average price increase and production decrease observed for each traded
commodity in U.S. agriculture was assumed to proportionally apply to agricultural production in
other countries. Thus, if for a given CE price average U.S. prices for rice went up by x percent
and production down by y percent, the same shift was applied to rice supply in foreign regions in
all implementing countries. We used this crude approximation because alternative reasonable
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assumptions were not availablec. Empirical results derived from supply shifts in nonU.S. countries should therefore be considered illustrative but not definitive. In presenting our
empirical results we will focus on a comparison between the various implementation scenarios
examined.
4.3 Full Annex I Implementation
The results for full Annex I country implementation are shown in Table 1. U.S.
agricultural production and exports decline but not as much as in the unilateral case. This
diminished response reflects the fact that only the non-Annex I countries now have comparative
advantage over U.S. agriculture. Leakage occurs in non-Annex I countries whose production
expands by 20 percent at a $100 CE price. Prices of traded agricultural commodities increase
slightly more under full Annex I implementation. The welfare results show overall U.S. welfare
is reduced less but consumers loose even more than under unilateral implementation. On the
other hand, U.S. producers always gain.
Annex I countries' net exports are highest under U.S. unilateral implementation but
lowest if all Annex I countries are subjected to agricultural mitigation policies. Equivalently,
non-Annex I countries' net exports are highest under full Annex I country implementation. All
of these observed changes become more substantial the more the CE-price increases. Note that
the Annex I accounts displayed in all figures do not involve the U.S. to avoid double counting.

c

It is also not clear if the cost increases elsewhere would be bigger or smaller as expansions elsewhere may

involve new land development which could be subject to substantial carbon taxes.
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Total emission reductions from U.S. agriculture are almost identical for all
scenarios up to CE-prices of $55 per ton (Figure 1). Above $85 per ton of CE, additional
emission reductions become smaller under full Annex I country implementation. For example,
at a CE-price of $100 per ton, emission reductions are about 11 percent lower than for U.S. alone
implementation. U.S. emissions rise because higher commodity prices lead to more intensive
production and less adoption of sequestration and emission control activities. This would be
offset by emission reductions in the Annex I agriculture but we cannot quantitatively represent
that in our model as we do not have model components depicting emissions in those countries
and extrapolation of U.S. rates would involve even more heroic assumptions than we are now
making.
4.4 Global GHGE Mitigation Implementation
Provisions in the KP permit emissions credits where GHGE emission reductions from
projects in non-Annex I countries may be counted as part of the emission reduction obligation
for project sponsors in Annex I countries. If such provisions were implemented, low cost
activities in agriculture could be exploited globally. This situation is represented by the last
scenario, where production globally is shifted using the U.S. average price and cost shift
assumptions as explained above. Tables 1 and 2 list the main impacts. We find increased U.S.
market shares at the expense of foreign countries, particularly the non-Annex I ones. Leakage is
contained with all regions decreasing aggregate production. Prices rise more than in the U.S.
unilateral or KP cases. Note this is a property of the assumptions as we have successively shifted
more and more of the total model supply curve.
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U.S. producers welfare gains are highest in such a situation and consumers
losses. Global mitigation efforts affect the level of emissions. The more countries implement
GHGE mitigation policies, the smaller are net emission reductions from U.S. agriculture. For
example, at a CE-price of $100 per ton, emissions offsets are about 21 percent lower than for
U.S. unilateral implementation.

5. Conclusions
The prospect of greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies has stimulated a wide search
for cost-efficient emission reduction methods. Agriculture including forestry has been proposed
as a relatively cheap source of net emission reductions. However, concerns have been expressed
about agricultural abatement policies being hosted in only a subset of all countries. The
comparative advantage gained in the agricultural sectors of non-host countries could distort trade
patterns, harm domestic agricultural producers in host countries, and lead to increased emissions
in non-host countries. Our investigation in the context of the U.S. agricultural sector, confirm
tradeoffs between agricultural emission reductions and traditional food and fiber production. In
particular, the two most carbon abating strategies, afforestation and production of biofuels, cause
the greatest decline in traditional agricultural production. If the positive relationship between
agricultural production and agricultural emissions also holds in foreign countries, then our results
imply increased greenhouse gas emissions in non-host countries. However, the consequences of
such emission leakage would not necessarily be incurred by non-host countries but by those
countries, which are most vulnerable to climate change.
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The findings of this paper have several implications for policy makers. First, if
national agricultural greenhouse gas mitigation policies are not synchronized with foreign
greenhouse gas emission policies, substantial leakage may occur. For example, if an
international treaty like the Kyoto Protocol were implemented, emission reductions in Annex I
countries would most likely be accompanied by emission increases in Non-Annex I (developing)
countries. Several alternatives exist to prevent emission increases through agriculture in nonhost countries. For example, the Kyoto Protocol proposes Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean
Development Mechanisms (CDM). Through such mechanisms, host countries could establish
incentives for agricultural producers in non-host countries to avoid emission intensive
technologies.
Second, U.S. farmers' would benefit from a larger number of countries hosting
greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies. The more countries abate greenhouse gases
through the agricultural sector, the higher agricultural commodity prices would be. Income
support has been a longtime objective of American farm bills and carbon payments/taxes
contribute to farm income support but at the expense of consumers. The unanswered general
equilibrium question is whether the consumer is better off if GHGE mitigation is carried out in
agriculture as opposed to elsewhere in the economy but this is beyond the scope of this study. If
the U.S. and other potential host countries would financially support Clean Development
Mechanism initiatives in non-host countries, i.e. Non-Annex I countries, a portion of that
expenditure could pay back because higher agricultural prices eliminate the need for expensive
farm bills.
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Third, if implementation of an equivalent mitigation policy or CDM in all
countries is politically infeasible, trade policies might need to be negotiated to discourage
increases in non-participating countries and to discourage leakages.
Fourth, credits for agricultural emission abatement could be discounted to reflect likely
emission leakage through agricultural sectors in non-host countries. This adjustment would
imply higher discount factors for agricultural mitigation strategies, which divert farmland. Such
strategies are afforestation and biofuel production. However, strategies, which are
complementary to traditional food and fiber production, such as reduced tillage, would remain
eligible for full credit. A differential treatment of agricultural mitigation strategies would then
increase the relative adoption of complementary strategies and thus reduce leakage.
Fifth, consumers of agricultural products incur higher expenses due to price increases.
The more countries participate in mitigation efforts, the higher are losses to both domestic and
foreign consumers. Consequently, more people may become dependant on governmental aid to
ensure sufficient food consumption.
There are also implications for modelers. Our results show deviation from the results of
previous studies, which only looked at fossil fuel based carbon emission taxes. Consideration of
emissions from other sources such as methane, nitrous oxide and land related carbon releases are
also important and should be considered in future studies. The results also show international
adjustments and potential leakage are important modeling concerns.
The quantitative effects presented in this study reflect several simplifying assumptions
and uncertain data, and should therefore be considered preliminary. While efforts will continue
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to improve the underlying data, the basic nature of our findings is unlikely to change.
Possible extensions to our work could also involve a general equilibrium analysis.
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Table 1

Impacts of Carbon Equivalent Prices on Fisher Ideal Price and Quantity
Indices of Production, and Traded

$10

US Only
$20

$100

Mitigation Policy in
US and Annex I Countries
$10
$20
$100

93.47

99.87

$10

All Countries
$20

$100

U.S.
Production of Traded Crops
All Production

99.60

99.09

99.64

97.09

100.52

100.59

105.11

99.33

99.04

97.53

99.93

99.16

97.43

99.47

99.32

98.59

100.57

101.42

110.60

100.76

101.82

113.44

101.22

102.28

121.68

98.84

97.44

81.77

99.93

99.50

97.65

102.19

103.28

126.92

99.96

99.93

99.60

99.95

99.91

99.44

99.98

99.94

99.71

Annex I Countries (excluding U.S.)

100.36

100.69

102.66

99.51

98.81

92.31

99.61

99.94

99.25

Non-Annex I Countries

100.32

100.93

112.22

100.49

102.15

120.13

96.89

93.85

57.60

Overall Agricultural Product Prices
Exports
Production of traded commodities in
rest of world
Global production

d

Note: Trading crops production includes the production for corn, soybeans, sorghum, rice, and four kind

of wheat defined previous; all production includes production for all primary products (crops and livestock) defined
in the model.
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Table 2

Impacts of Carbon Equivalent Prices on Agricultural Sector

Welfare (Million Dollars) and U.S. Emissions (MMT)e
Mitigation Policy in
Annex I Countries

USA Only

All Countries

$10

$20

$100

$10

$20

$100

$10

$20

$100

U.S. Consumers'
Surplus

-540
(-0.05)

-1,240
(-0.10)

-9,159
(-0.77)

-607
(-0.05)

-1,536
(-0.13)

-11,355
(-0.96)

-749
(-0.06)

-1,976
(-0.17)

-17,607
(-1.49)

Net U.S. Producers'
Surplus with GHG
tax/pay

-207.32
(-0.46)

-161.70
(-0.36)

7,430
(16.35)

-71.61
(-0.16)

449
(0.99)

13,037
(28.69)

264.39
(0.58)

1,479
(3.26)

27,336
(60.15)

Ag Producers' Surplus
without GHG Pay

696
(1.53)

1,353
(2.98)

7,689
(16.92)

835
(1.84)

1,976
(4.35)

14,380
(31.64)

1172
(2.58)

3,024
(6.65)

30,037
(66.10)

Total Welfare without
GHG Pay

156
(0.01)

113
(0.01)

-1,471
(-0.12)

228
(0.02)

440
(0.04)

3,025
(0.25)

424
(0.03)

1,048
(0.09)

12,430
(1.01)

Total GHG payments
to agriculture

-903

-1,514

-259

-907

-1,526

-1,342

-908

-1,545

-2,701

Net Welfare

-748
(-0.06)

-1,402
(-0.11)

-1,730
(-0.14)

-678
(-0.06)

-1,087
(-0.09)

1,683
(0.14)

-484
(-0.04)

-497
(-0.04)

9,728
(0.79)

Foreign Country
Surplus

-210
(-0.09)

-395
(-0.16)

-3,516
(-1.45)

1012
(0.42)

2,140
(0.89)

17,902
(7.40)

2557
(1.06)

5,360
(2.22)

42,156
(17.44)

Global Agric. Welfare

-54
(-0.003)

-282
(-0.02)

-4,986
(-0.34)

1240
(0.08)

2,579
(0.18)

20,928
(1.42)

2981
(0.2)

6,408
(0.44)

54,586
(3.71)

U.S. Agricultural GHG
Emissions

90.37

76.74

2.58

90.61

76.32

13.40

90.81

77.23

27.01

e

The numbers in parentheses give the percentage change with respect to the zero CE-price scenarios.

Gross welfare items exclude GHGE charges/payments.

